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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

S & G, INC., a corporation,
PlaintiffAppellant,
-vs-

CASE NO. 860555

ROBERT L. MORGAN, State
Engineer of the State of Utah,
DefendantRespondent.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
S & G, Inc., the Plaintiff-Appellant, ("S & G") sought
judicial

review

in the Trial

Defendant-Respondent

State

Court

Engineer

from

a Decision

("State

of the

Engineer11) which

sharply limited the amount of water which S & G could sever from
228 acres

of

land

in Millard

County

culinary supply system of Delta City.

and

transfer

into the

The only issue before the

State Engineer and the Trial Court was the limitation on the
quantity of water which the State Engineer would allow S & G to
transfer.

S & G, severely limited in that quantity by the State

Engineer's decision, filed its Complaint under §73-3-14, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 (Addendum p. i) in the District Court of
Millard

County

for

plenary

review

of

the

State

Engineer's

Decision.
The State Engineer moved to dismiss the Complaint on
the ground that S & G had already conveyed to Delta City whatever

rights it had to use water on the 228 acres and therefore had no
standing to sue.

DISPpSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Motion was submitted to the Trial Court on briefs
without oral argument.
On

September

9,

1986

the

Court

entered

a

Ruling

dismissing the Complaint (R.107) and on September 17th entered a
"Revised Ruling11 ordering that the Motion be treated as one for
Summary Judgment, granting the Summary Judgment, and dismissing
the Complaint (R.92,93).

On October 9, 1986 a formal "Order and

Judgment" (Addendum p. ii) was entered in which the Trial Court
recited that S & G "had some interest in the Decision of the
State Engineer" but that "such interest was not within the 'Zone
of Interest1 contemplated as being a basis for appeal from the
Decision of the State Engineer" and dismissed S & Gfs action with
prejudice (R.102,103)-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff-Appellant will be referred to as "S & G"
and Defendant-Respondent as the "State Engineer".
In 1980 S & G owned in Millard County 228 acres of land
with the right to divert and use 5 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.)
of water from a well thereon from April 1 to October 31 of each
year under a Certificate issued by the State Engineer in 1967
(R.89).

Translated into units, 5 c.f.s. for those 214 days of

permitted pumping is the equivalent of 2140 acre feet of water

annually.
had

S & G alleged in its Complaint that 2140 acre feet

been

beneficially

consumed

on

its

land

(R.2).

[The

Certificate of Appropriation to do so is attached as Addendum p.
v.]
By a contract dated July 22, 1980 S & G agreed to sell
a

fixed

portion of its water right

(R. 49-61) but

this

contract was

(521 acre

amended

"Amendment") to sell the entire water

feet) to IPA

in April

right.

1981

(the

The Amendment

(R.63-69) contains the only contract provisions material to this
case (R.63-67).
increased

the

sole

irrigation requirements of 228 acres of land***", i.e.:

2140

acre

to

In the Amendment the quantity of water sold was

feet,

elaboration

"***sufficient

(R.63,
that

U3)
the

water***

subject,
amount

to

however

sold

satisfy

to

would

the

be

qualifying

that

quantity

!f

***approved for diversion and use for municipal purposes under

the proposed change application
1953]

referred

to

***

[required by §73-3-3, U.C.A.,

hereinafter"

(R.64,

sub-13).

[These

provisions of the contract are attached as Addendum pp. vi and
vii. ]
Dispositive of the simple issue before the Court is the
language of the Amendment (R.64) [exhibited at Addendum p. vii]
which fixes the precise procedure for determining the ultimate
purchase price.

One c.f.s. running continuously for 24 hours yields 2 acre
feet [the amount necessary to cover 1 acre to a depth of 2 feet].
Five c.f.s. thus equals 10 acre feet per day x 214 days equals
2,140 acre feet. Calculation:
60 [seconds] x 60 [minutes] x 24
[hours] = 86,400. One acre = 43,560 sq. ft.; 2 acres = 87,120
sq. ft. x 1 cubic foot of water = 2 acres inundated one foot in
depth (in one day).

11

[the purchase price shall
ascertained by calculating]

be

ultimately

***(c)
The sum equal to Eight Hundred
Seventy-Five Dollars ($875.00) times the
number of acre feet in excess of 521.0 acre
feet annually which shall be approved for
diversion and use for municipal purposes
under
the
proposed
change
application
referred to in paragraph 8 hereinafter by
(i) the final written Decision of
the Utah State Engineer without judicial
review, or
(ii) the final judgment of approval
by the appropriate District Court without
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, or
(iii) the final decision of approval
by the Utah Supreme Court.
In the event the Utah State Engineer in the
first instance, or the Court on judicial
review thereafter, does not fix the quantity
of water in acre feet which can be diverted
and used for such municipal purposes under
such change application the quantity will be
presumed to be 4.0 acre feet per acre for
purposes of fixing the amount of the
foregoing payment.***
(R.64 and Addendum
p.vii) [Emphasis added]
Thus S & G's water right was purchased in its entirety
by Intermountain Power Agency ("IPA") to be used by the City of
Delta.

(Purchase by IPA of the water right for Delta paid a part

of IPAfs "impact" obligations imposed upon it for construction
and

other

permits

issued

by

Millard

County

for

IPA's

establishment of a massive electric power plant in the County
[R.46 - last sentence].)

The water right transaction involved in

this case was exclusively by the foregoing contract.

The well

sold is in a huge acquifer of unlimited resource; therefore the
only restriction on ability to deliver the entire 5 c.f.s. (2140
acre feet) would be limitations imposed by the State Engineer

(R.2,3; allegations of the Complaint which should be assumed to
be true for purposes of this appeal).
The contract also provided that if the State Engineer
fixed no specific quantity then the arbitrary figure of 4 acre
feet of water per acre of S & G!s land would be the measure of
compensation from IPA to S & G (R.64 and Addendum vii).

S & G

maintained that it had, historically and consistently, applied to
beneficial use and actually depleted in excess of nine (9) acre
feet of water each year on each of the 228 acres from which the
water was severed (R.2,3 and see conversion of c.f.s. to acre
feet, f.n. 1 at p. 3, supra).
The State Engineer, after an administrative hearing,
fixed the amount transferrable from S & G to Delta at 3.4 acre
feet per acre (R.47) being a minimum of 365 acre feet and a
maximum of 1570 less than S & Gfs reasonable expectations and
definitely lower than even the best estimate of IPA (R.64).
State

Engineer's

rationale was

that

only

3.4

acre

The

feet was

actually consumed at the existing well and therefore to transfer
more

water

would

enlarge

S & G's

right

(R.46-48).

This

conclusion was vigorously challenged by S & G (R.2).
It is undisputed that IPA has contracted to pay and
will pay S & G for all the water it can legally transfer to Delta
City (R.2 [Complaint 18]; R.ll [Answer conceding this allegation
16]).
S & G's

predicate

for

judicial

review

is

that

its

contract with IPA was and is still executory, i.e.: the parties
have never quantified the amount of water transferable and that

it cannot be ascertained what dollar amount was owed on IPA's
liability to S & G without judicial review in which S & G has a
right to prove, if possible, that the State Engineer's reduction
from over

9 to 3.4

acre feet of water was

an unreasonable

limitation on the amount of water which S & G could transfer to
Delta City (Complaint, R.2,3).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
S & G has a contract right to sell and to be paid for
all of the water transferable from the land in Millard County.
The purpose of this litigation is to fix the amount of water
transferrable and this very litigation was contemplated by the
sales contract to IPA.
The Trial Court dismissed

S & G's

Complaint on the

ground that it had no standing to sue.
The argument of S & G for reversal of that ruling can
be summarized as follows:
1.
quantity
transfer.
it

has

Both the buyer and seller contemplated a higher

of water

than

the

State Engineer

allowed

S & G to

S & G has never been paid the purchase price because
never

been

judicially

determined,

as

contemplated, how much water could be transferred.

the

contract

The contract

contemplated a judicial determination in the event any appeal
were taken from the State Engineer's decision.
2.

Even though S & G had deeded its water right to IPA

the contract survived the deed as respect to provision for the
amount of payment; and these judicial proceedings are to resolve,

by

final

appeal

to

the

courts, the amount which

S & G can

transfer, which is the measure of S & G's compensation.
3.
"Zone

of

S & G's
Interest"

claims and entitlements
clearly

contemplated

are within the
by

the

statute

authorizing judicial review of decisions of the State Engineer
(§73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953).
A.

S & G's water right is a valuable vested property

interest and unless it has recourse to the courts under the
statute which authorizes plenary review by any aggrieved party
S & G will be severely prejudiced and its property taken without
due process of law.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THIS ACTION IS MAINTAINABLE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF ESTABLISHING TITLE TO THE WATER S & G SOLD
TO DELTA CITY.
A.

THE CONTRACT REMAINS EXECUTORY.

B.

A VENDOR MAY ALWAYS MAINTAIN AN ACTION
AGAINST THIRD PARTIES TO CURE DEFECTS IN
TITLE.
POINT II

S & G IS AN AGGRIEVED PARTY AND MUST BE
INCLUDED IN ANY PLENARY REVIEW.
POINT III
THE "ZONE OF INTEREST" TEST IS TO BE APPLIED
WITH LIBERAL GENEROSITY TO ONE WHOSE RIGHTS
ARE AFFECTED.
POINT IV
WATER RIGHTS ARE VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS.

POINT V
THE ISSUES WERE NOT MOOT.
POINT VI
S & G IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS ACTION IS MAINTAINABLE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF ESTABLISHING TITLE TO THE WATER S & G SOLD
TO DELTA CITY.
A.

THE CONTRACT REMAINS EXECUTORY.

Since the Court below held that S & G had no standing
to sue Article III Section 3(c) of the Amendment (Addendum p.vii)
is of conclusive significance to this appeal.

That sub-section

provides that until the quantity of water in acre feet which can
be severed and used for municipal purposes is decided by a final
written Decision of approval by the appropriate District Court or
the final decision of approval by the Utah Supreme Court the
quantity of water useable for such municipal purposes under such
change application the quantity will be presumed to be 4.0 acre
feet per acre for purposes of fixing the amount of the payment
(R.64).

This obviously leaves the amount of final payment due

S & G to the Courts if any party is dissatisfied with the State
Engineer's ruling.

S & G is dissatisfied and has exercised its

contract right to access to the Court because the State Engineer
ruled that only 3.4 acre feet of water per acre of land could be
transferred to Delta City for municipal purposes (R.47) whereas
S & G claims in excess of nine is transferable.

Paragraph

7 of the Agreement between S & G and IPA

provides that the sum prescribed in paragraph 3(c) shall be paid
by IPA directly to the Seller upon the expiration of time for
judicial review (R.65).

This appeal is timely (R.48, 1). An

earlier agreement between S & G and IPA sought the water for
industrial purposes (R.49) and fixed a definite amount of water
in acre footage, to-wit:
(R.52).

521 acre feet to be paid for in one sum

This obviously would not have involved a question about

entitlement to deliver the total water supply contemplated by the
earlier agreement because S & G had the gross entitlement of
2,140 acre feet or approximately 4 times that contemplated by the
July 22, 1980 agreement (see footnote 1, page 3 in Statement of
Facts).
By

amending

the

Water

Right

Purchase

Contract

to

convert the supply from industrial to municipal purposes the
parties to the contract intended that a minimum of 4 acre feet
per acre would be allowed but that the City of Delta would
acquire all of the water which could be transferred from the 228
acres (R.63,64).

The contract of April, 1981 which is found at

those pages (R.63,64) did not specify a fixed quantity of water
in acre footage to be affected by the agreement but "presumed11
that it would be at least 4 acre feet and if no judicial review
were pursued it would be that amount the State Engineer would
permit to be transferred.

This case falls squarely within the

contemplation of the rule that a vendor does not have to have
complete title to the property sold until the purchaser has made

his

payments.

Marlow

Investment

P. 2d 1402 (Utah 1971).

Corporation

vs.

Radmall,

485

In that case the vendors disposed of a

part of the property sold while the purchaser was in default.
The Utah Supreme Court held

that this would not excuse the

purchaser from his obligation to make payments.
In Corporation

Nine

vs.

Taylor,

513 P.2d 417, 30 U.2d

47 (1973), the encumbrance was in the form of a mortgage and the
Court said:
"The law does not require the vendor to have
clear and marketable title at all times
during the performance of his contract, and
is not ordinarily so obliged until the time
comes for him to perform11. (513 P.2d at 417)
The same ruling can be found in Woodard^
Allen,

et

ux.

vs.

1 U.2d 220, 265 P.2d 398.
Thus, until final compensation is payable the vendor

always can continue to perfect or enhance the quality of his
title.
A contract is executory when there remain particular
things which are the object of a contract left to be performed.
17 Am.Jur.2d p. 341, Contracts, §6.

A contract where the total

purchase price has not been finally determined would therefore be
an "executory11 contract.
S & G has not transferred nor been paid for any more
water than the State Engineer would permit it to transfer.

In

fact, IPA has not paid S & G for the full 3.4 acre feet per acre
allowed by the State Engineer precisely because there has been no
final legal disposition of the case.

S & G is damaged by a

decision of the State Engineer which makes

it impossible to

deliver the water which will produce the consideration S & G
reasonably expected to be paid.

B.

A VENDOR MAY ALWAYS MAINTAIN AN ACTION
AGAINST THIRD PARTIES TO CURE DEFECTS IN
TITLE.

It

is

elemental,

almost

too

obvious

to

require

argument, that a vendor may always endeavor to cure defects or
insufficiencies in the vendor's title (77 Am.Jur.2d p.403, Vendor
and Purchaser §229).
It is a common form of action, universally entertained
by the courts, for a vendor to bring his title up to a standard
which will insure to the vendor a quality of title conforming
most closely to the expectation of the parties.

In the last

cited treatise at page 407, Vendor and Purchaser §233 the text
writer states:
"Defects
in
the
title
rendering
it
unmarketable frequently are obviated by
appropriate proceedings to that end in a
court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the parties, wherein a decree is
made, the effect of which is to render the
vendor's title marketable***"
Similar statements are found throughout Part E of 77
Am.Jur.2d (§§229-240) one of which cites the Utah case of Woodard
vs.

Allen,

1 U.2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (77 Am.Jur.2d p.408 f.n. 95)

as authority authorizing curative or corrective action at all
times during the executory period of the contract.
If a vendor is allowed to cure defects or settle title
questions up until a contract is entirely consummated how may it
be seriously argued that the vendor has no standing to sue?

POINT II
S & G IS AN AGGRIEVED PARTY AND MUST BE
INCLUDED IN ANY PLENARY REVIEW.
Section 73-3-14, U.C.A.,

1953 authorizes any person

"aggrieved" by a Decision of the State Engineer to bring a civil
action in the District Court for plenary review thereof.
aggrieved party is one suffering a direct

An

injury and actual

damages as stated in Vol. 1A C.J.S. p.444, Actions, §58,
***the party to sue is one whose right, or a
duty to whom, has been violated***
S & G is the only one whose right (to water) has been affected
because S & G still owns whatever it has not been paid for; and
is the one a duty to whom has been violated because Delta City is
not paying anything for the water right and IPA has not paid and
will

not

pay

for

more

than

the

water

transferrable by the State Engineer.

determined

to

be

S & G is the aggrieved

party.
Section 73-3-14, U.C.A.1953 authorizing appeals from
the State Engineer to the District Court provides that the review
shall be "plenary".
Plenary

review

appellate examinations.
complete,

absolute,

Mashunkashey,

et al.,

"Plenary
complete review."
431 (1940).

is

the

broadest

of

all

types

of

The word "plenary" means full, entire,

perfect,

Mashunkashey

unqualified.

vs.

134 P.2d 976, 979, 191 Okl. 521 (1942).
Review"

is

D&RGWER vs.

"Plenary

defined
PSC,

as

a

"full

review, a

100 P. 2d 552, 555, 98 Utah

[power]" gives a court jurisdiction "as

London Co. vs.

broad as equity and justice require."

Joslowitz

,

279 App.Div. 280, 110 NYS.2d 58.
To exclude S & G as a party having intense interest in
the outcome of the State Engineer's decision is to remove the
term "plenary" from the review statute.

POINT III
THE "ZONE OF INTEREST" TEST IS TO BE APPLIED
WITH LIBERAL GENEROSITY TO ONE WHOSE RIGHTS
ARE AFFECTED.
S & G

suffers

a

demonstrably

severe

injury

to its

rights by the administrative decision of the State Engineer.

The

fact it had deeded its water right to Delta City was not, in the
most extreme interpretation of the facts, the consummate or final
act making

the

contract

fully

executed.

At

the expense of

repetition, S & Gfs contract rights are totally dependent upon a
"final judgment of approval

[of the quantity of transferable

water] by the appropriate District Court*** or the final decision
of

approval

by

the

Utah

Supreme

Court"

(Addendum

p.vii).

Nevertheless the District Court held S & G not to be within the
"Zone

of

Interest"

contemplated

by

the

statute

authorizing

plenary judicial review of decisions of the State Engineer.
A recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth

Circuit

treats

the

subject

of

"interest"

in

a

straightforward manner, observing that the policies underlying
the "interest" requirement are generic and must be applied to the
particular

facts

of

each

case

(736

F.2d

at

p.

1420).

In

Sanguine^

Ltd.

vs.

U.S.

Department

of

Interior

736 F.2d 1416

f

(C.A. Okla. 1984) a mineral lease was involved which obliged
interest-holders in the minority of lands affected by the lease
to adhere

to a cooperative

(unit) agreement

adopted by

the

majority and then approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Nine individual movants-in-intervention sought to be heard and
the

government

resisted

on

the

grounds

of untimeliness

and

failure of an interest "relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action11 under Rule 24, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (closely parallel to Utah's Rule with the same
number).
and

Irrespective of the language of the respective Federal

State

procedural

rules,

the

question

of

"interest"

sufficient, under either rule, to maintain the litigation was met
head-on.

The Circuit Court handled it as "a practical guide to

disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned
persons as is compatible with *** due process" (Id. p.1420).

The

government pressed an argument strikingly synonymous to the State
Engineers, i.e.:

"the leases in issue do not grant intervenors

a voice in accepting or rejecting a communitization agreement and
consequently
intervention."

their

interest

is

too

remote

to

justify

The State Engineer is saying here that because

S & G had conveyed (albeit subject to the contract) they could
not object to the administrative decision.
The likelinesses of Sanguine
there.

with this case do not end

The Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs had

made a ruling affecting the potential but unrealized
unascertainable) interests of the movants.

(or even

Also, the movants

asserted that their interests were "not adequately represented1
Delta City, grantee in the deed upon which the State Engineer
supports his position, did not even appear in the administrative
hearing of the State Engineer (R.46) and is thus far absent here
to represent anyone in the material issue.
The Tenth Circuit held

it was

sufficient

that the

movants could show a direct economic benefit in a ruling which
might be favorable to them.
In Natural
Nuclear

Regulatory

(736 F.2d at 1420)

Resources
Commission,

Defense

Council,

Inc.

vs.

U.S.

578 F.2d 1341 (C.A. 10 N.M. 1978)

the Tenth Circuit dealt with sufficiency of the interest to
support standing to assert it in judicial review.

It said that

an interest (to sue) does not hinge on a direct interest; that
construction
rejected

being

too narrow.

if no property

interest

Only

can

of any

their

presence be

character

could be

impaired by the outcome (578 F.2d at 1344) and that interest did
not even have to be direct (Id.).
(The boundary was drawn where bird feathers claimed to
be

ecologically

threatened

were

an

insufficient

interest

to

maintain an action, 578 F.2d at 1344.)
The United

States Supreme Court has delineated the

"Zone of Interest" to test standing in Clarke

vs.

Securities

Industry

Assn.,

(1987).

Interpreting the National Banking Act as it applies to

479 U.S.

, 93 L.Ed.2d 757, 107 S.Ct.

See U.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) ***[intervention is permitted as a
right] "when the representation of the applicant's interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or
may be bound by a judgment***".

branch

banks,

the

Court

held

that

a

trade

association

representing securities brokers, inter alia, had standing to sue
for judicial characterization of certain institutions as branch
banks

in

locations

offensive

to

the

trade

association,

a

characterization the Comptroller of the Currency had refused to
adopt.

Clarke

recites history of lower (Circuit) Court decisions

which had held that to be within the "Zone of Interest11 required
a showing of a "legal interest" or alternatively occupancy of the
status

of

one

"aggrieved"

under

the

relevant

statute

(the

Administrative Procedures Act) permitting review by any party
"adversely affected or aggrieved" (93 L.Ed.2d at 765, 766). [It
is

significant

that

Utah's

statute

reads

comparably;

i.e.:

f!

***any person aggrieved*** may*** bring a civil action***".]

The Supreme Court said that now, as in the past, it was unwilling
to take

the Comptroller's

narrow perception

of

the generous

review provisions of the Administrative Practices Act (5. U.S.
Code §§551 et. seq.) re-affirming that it should be construed not
"grudgingly but as serving a broadly remedial purpose".
The precedents in Clarke

as applied to this case are

(1) that the "legal interest" test was determined
narrow.

to be too

Here the State Engineer contends that because S & G had

deeded the water right to Delta City it lost legal title to the
subject

matter.

But

S & G

still has unquestioned

equitable

rights under the contract (the right to have the purchase price
determined and to have it then paid); (2) S & G has standing as
an "aggrieved party" (as we have considered in Point II hereof)

under the specific statute authorizing this appeal (§73-3-14,
U.C.A. 1953) and S & G is unchallengeably affected in a highly
adverse manner.
Association

Citing
Organizations,

Inc.

vs.

Camp,

of

Data

Processing

Service

397 U.S. 150, 25 L.Ed.2d

184, 90

S.Ct. 827, the Court said that even where there were no review
provided by statute, a person "adversely affected or aggrieved,
i.e.: injured in fact" and whose position was "arguably" within
the Zone of Interest to be protected by the statute, nevertheless
had standing to sue.

It cannot be denied that the owner of a

water right subject of a sale contract whose diminution by the
State Engineer drastically reduces the purchase price is not at a
minimum within that "Zone of Interest" protected by statute (in
this case §73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953).
The Supreme Court expressly approved the trend toward
the

enlargement

administrative
concretely
lines:
order

of
action

the

class

(93

of

people

L.Ed.2d

at

who

767)

a division boundary marking

may

and

challenge
illustrated

the zone of interest

milk handlers could seek review of a federal pricing
but

ultimate

consumers

could

not

because

so

vastly

broadening the zone would disrupt the administrative scheme.
Summarizing, the Supreme Court circumscribed the zone
by the following language:
The zone of interest test is a guide for
deciding whether, in view of Congress1
evident
intent
to make
agency
action
presumptively
reviewable,
a
particular
plaintiff should be heard to complain of a
particular agency decision. In cases where
the plaintiff is not itself the subject of
the contested regulatory action, the test

denies a right of review if the plaintiff's
interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in
the statute that it cannot reasonably be
assumed that Congress intended to permit the
suit. The test is not meant to be especially
demanding, in particular, there need be no
indication
of
congressional
purpose
to
benefit the would-be plaintiff.
In Terracor

vs.

Utah Board of State

Lands,

et at.,

716

P.2d 796, (Utah 1986) at 799, Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
11

***[ there are] general standards for
determining whether a litigant has standing
*** the first being that the plaintiff must
be able to show some distinct and palpable
injury that gives him a personal stake in the
outcome*** Second, he may have standing if no
one else has a greater interest in the
outcome of the case and the issues are
unlikely to be raised at all unless that
particular plaintiff has standing to raise
the issue."
In Berry

vs.

Beech

Aircraft,

111

P.2d 670 at 674, the

Court dealt with Article I, Section 11, Constitution of the State
of Utah, which provides:
All courts shall be open, [to] every person,
for an injury done to him in his person [or]
property ***The clear language of the section
guarantees access to the courts and a
judicial procedure that is based on fairness
and equality.
Standing consists of an entity's sufficient interest in
the

outcome

of

litigation

to

warrant

consideration

of

its

position by a court.
Standing is, nevertheless, not an absolute concept, but
rather is variable, and is closely related to the nature of the
controversy and the relief sought.
be

determined

by

the nature

of

Accordingly, standing is to
the

plaintiff's interest in its outcome.

action, as well

as by

Moreover, in deciding the

question of standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to
look

to

the

substantive

issues

involved

for

the purpose of

determining whether there is a logical nexus between the status
asserted by complainant and the claim sought to be adjudicated.
Wickham vs.

Fisher,

629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981).

A plaintiff generally has standing to sue when it has
such a legitimate interest in a matter as to warrant asking a
court to entertain it.
An action may be brought on the basis of a bare legal
title, without a beneficial interest in a cause of action, or on
the basis of a beneficial interest in the subject matter and
relief sought, without a legal title or interest therein.

Vol.

1A C.J.S. pp.445-447, Actions, §§59, 60.
The statute controlling standing in this case allows an
appeal to the District Court by an "aggrieved11 party (§73-3-14
U.C.A. 1953).
Watson vs.

Collins,

21 Cal. Rptr. 832, 836, 204 C.A.2d

27 says an "aggrieved party" need not be an original party to the
transaction
pecuniary

but

merely

loss.

Deseret

Commerce vs.
267,

270

State

one

Mortuary

Securities

(1931) holds

who

has
Co.

Commission,

"*** the word

suffered
vs.

Ogden

prejudice
Chamber

or
of

78 Utah 393, 3 P.2d
aggrieved

refers

to a

substantial grievance, a denial of some personal property right
or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation."

POINT IV
WATER RIGHTS ARE VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS.
The right to the use of water is a vested property

§73-1-1, U.C.A., 1953; Ronzio vs.

interest.
Western
vs.

Rail

Co.,

Criddle,

Irrigation

116 F.2d 604 (1946); Mosby Irrigation

(1960)
Company vs.

170, 271 P.2d 449.

Denver & Rio Grande

11 U.2d
Deseret

41, 354
Irrigation

P.2d

Company

848; East

Company,

Bench

(1954) 2 U.2d

S & G is deprived of a vested property right

by refusal of the District Court to allow an appeal from a
decision which materially decreases the water right S & G owns.

POINT V
THE ISSUES WERE NOT MOOT.
The Trial Court held that since S & G had deeded its
water right to Delta City the issue was no longer justiciable and
implied it had became moot.

Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 1A pp.

415 and 416, Actions §39, treats this issue by the following
statement:
On the other hand, mootness is commonly not
found
in
actions
which
present
real
controversies
affecting
the
substantive
rights of the parties, or in which only one,
or some, of several issues has become moot.
Accordingly, an action is not moot as long as
any single claim for either primary or
secondary relief remains viable or where it
remains litigable due to the continuing
adverse effects of the events in issue or
their collateral consequences.
The issue is not moot for other substantial reasons:
The

decision

of

the

State

Engineer

not

only

restricts

the

transferability of water, it also limits, if the State Engineer's

decision is unappealable, the amount of water which S & G could
use on its own land regardless of any sale.

Stated differently,

the State Engineer has disregarded the amount of water which has
actually been put to a beneficial use on S & G's land.

The Trial

Court has precluded S & G from litigating that very issue.
contract remains executory:

The

IPA has not paid the full amount of

the purchase price awaiting a final determination of quantity
that can be sold.

Furthermore, S & G still owns the 228 acres to

which the water is appurtenant and upon which it has been used.
By disregarding actual practices the State Engineer has damaged
S & G!s land; nevertheless, the Trial Court has denied S & G the
right of review to determine correctness of that restriction.
If IPA fails to pay the remainder of the purchase price
(and it has not paid even up to the amount calculated by applying
the reduced 3.4 acre feet factor) and S & G takes the water right
back then the land's value, in the hands of S & G, will be
severely diminished.
S & G has the right to litigate not only what water
right it can sell for municipal purposes and having sold some of
it, what it may have left for continued crop irrigation on land
S & G has not sold.

S & G is entitled to review of the State

Engineer's decision as to what it still has left to use on its
land.
If the Trial Court judgment is not reversed, the State
Engineer's
become res

erroneous
adjudioata

diminution

of

S & Gfs

water

right will

on both water sold and water retained at an

unjustified lower level.

POINT VI
S & G IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
This brings us logically to the party-in-interest test.
The same encyclopedia (17A p.740, Contracts §312) says that even
a third party beneficiary is the real party in interest and may
prosecute an action upon the contract in his own name under a
real-party-in-interest statute.

Utah has such a statute, Rule

17(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring every action to be
prosecuted in the name of the party having the real interest in
the litigation.
Obviously someone has an entitlement to judicial review
of the State Engineer's decision.

IPA certainly is not going to

appeal to the District Court because it would only enlarge the
impact grant for which IPA would receive nothing more than what
it already has.

Delta City is a volunteer, paying nothing for

the water right

(the permits were

issued

to IPA by Millard

County) and has not and probably could not enforce an enlargement
of the gratuity.
S & G is painfully injured.

The State Engineer has

reduced the reasonable and justified expectation that S & G could
transfer the same amount of water it has historically put to
beneficial

- and depletive - use.

S & G has evidence which

cannot be controverted which says it has so beneficially used and
fully depleted over nine acre feet of water per acre.
be

compensated

until

concluding the issue.
party in interest.

the amount

is determined

It cannot

by an appeal

S & G is the real and in fact the only

CONCLUSION
Standing to sue is a threshold issue.
extraordinarily prejudicial
issue is simple:
Engineer's

It would be

to S & G if it cannot be heard.

The

cannot the only party aggrieved by the State

decision

appeal

from

it to perfect

the aggrieved

party's title as contemplated by the contract and as is provided
by law?

The difference is monumental:

can the State Engineer

reduce S & G's certificated right to use 2140 acre feet per year
to 775.2 acre feet and then deny S & G's right to appeal under a
statute which allows "plenary review" by "any person aggrieved?"
Except by reversal of the Trial Court's ruling that S & G has no
standing S & G will lose a valuable, vested property as well a
contract right.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN, MclFF & CHAMBERLAIN

By ^ ~ ^ / ; J W
Ken Chamberlain
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant, S & G, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant were mailed to Michael M. Quealy, Assistant
Attorney

General, Attorney

for

Respondent,

1636

West

North

Temple, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah (84116), by U.S. Regular
Mail, Postage Prepaid, on this 24th day of March, 1987,
\

73-3-13

WATER AND IRRIGATION

application therefor was not made until after
time first fixed by engineer had elapsed. Pool

v. Utah County Light & Power Co. (1909) 36
U 508,105 P 289.

73-3-13. Protests — Hearings and notice. Any other applicant or any
user of water from any river system or water source may protest to the
state engineer that such work is not being diligently prosecuted to completion, whereupon the state engineer shall give the applicant doing such work
or his assigns sixty days' notice by registered mail to his last recorded
address to appear on a date to be designated and show cause, if any he
has, why his application shall not be declared forfeited in whole or in part,
and on such date such applicant or his assigns shall be permitted to produce any lawful evidence tending to show compliance on his part with the
law. At such hearing the state engineer may hear and consider any and
all competent evidence tending to show whether or not the applicant or
his assigns have complied with the law. If diligence is not shown by the
applicant the state engineer may declare the application and all rights
thereunder forfeited. The decision of forfeiture shall be final unless an
action to review it is filed as provided by section 73-3-14.
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, ft 53; R. S. 1933,
100-3-13; L. 1937, ch. 130, 91; C. 1943,
100-3-13.
Compiler's Note*.
The 1937 amendment added the third and
fourth sentences; and deleted a former third
sentence which read: T h e state engineer
shall allow extensions for time during which
work was prevented by the operation of legal
proceedings involving an application beyond
the power of the applicant to avoid."
Adequate storage facilities,
Under this section it would seem that a
storage right may not be kept alive indefi-

nitely without any attempt to provide adequate storage facilities. If construction is not
prosecuted diligently to completion, any
other applicant or any user of water from
any river system or water source may protest
to the state engineer, and upon proper showing, state engineer may declare application
and all rights obtained thereunder void,
Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir
Co. (1943) 104 U 216, 140 P 2d 638, denying
rehearing of 104 U 202, 136 P 2d 108, which
case, however, was not an action to declare a
forfeiture because of a failure to prosecute
construction of the dams, but forfeiture
based on alleged failure to use water for five
years.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Notice) mmd bearing.
No one can obtain any right to use of any
wator from any public stream except upon
full notice and hearing before state engineer,

and any rights that are granted are always
subject to prior rights. United States v.
CaldweU (1924) 64 U 490, 231 P 434, applying
Laws 1897 (R. S. 1898, i 1268) now repealed.

73-3-14. Review by courts of engineer's decisions. In any case where
a decision of the state engineer is involved any person aggrieved by such
decision may within sixty days after notice thereof bring a civil action in
the district court for a plenary review thereof. The state engineer shall
give notice of his decision by mailing a copy thereof by regular mail to
the applicant and to each protestant and notice shall be deemed to have
been given on the date of mailing. The place of trial, subject to the power
of the court to change the same as provided by law, shall be in the county
in which the stream or water source, or some part thereof, is located. The
72
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73-8-14

state engineer must be joined as a defendant in all suits to review his decisions, but no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation shall be
rendered against him. Parties shall be served with process as in other cases
and notice of the pendency of such action shall be filed by the clerk of
the district court with the state engineer within twenty days after the
same is commenced which shall operate to stay all further proceedings
pending the decision of the district court.
History: L. 1919 ch. 67, (64; R. S. 193S,
100-8-14; L. 1987, ch. 180, f l ; C. 1948,
100-8-14.
Compiler's Note*.
The 1987 amendment inserted the second
and fourth sentences; and in the fifth sentence, inserted "by the clerk of the district
court" after "shall be filed."
Cross-References,
Change of venue, 78-18-8.
Service of summons, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4.
Appeal exclusive method of review.
The only manner in which a decision of the
state engineer may be reviewed is by way of
appeal. Smith v. Sanders (1948) 112 U 517,
189 P 2d 701.
In action to have defendant's right to use
water declared forfeited for non-use and to
enjoin any further use thereof, trial court
improperly granted summary judgment for
plaintiff since state engineer had granted
extension of time for defendant to resume
use and plaintiff did not use proper remedy
of civil action in district court for review of
state engineer's decision, but rather filed
action to have defendant's rights declared
forfeited which resulted in an attempt by
plaintiff to exercise authority granted specifically to state engineer to enjoin unlawful
diversion. Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Myers (1970)
24 U 2d 78, 465 P 2d 1018, distinguished'in
571 P 2d 1825.
Jurisdiction of district c o u r t
District court had jurisdiction under this
section to annul and vacate rulings and
orders of the state engineer which were in
conflict with a prior decree of the court even
though the engineer was not a party to the
action in which the prior decree was
rendered. Nye v. Bacon (1933) 81 U 846,18 P
2d 289.
Where the United States, in administering
the Federal Reclamation Act, applied to the
engineer for a change of place of diversion,
and claimed the right to make such a change
under the engineer's favorable decision, it

was subject to the jurisdiction of the district
court to review the engineer's decision.
United States v. District Court of Fourth
Judicial Dist (1961) 121 U 1, 288 P 2d 1182,
rehearing denied 121 U 18, 242 P 2d 774, distinguished in 2 U 2d 208, 271 P 2d 846.
Notice of engineer's decision.
Where only notice of decision of state engineer was mailed by state engineer and there
was no evidence of its receipt by appellant,
appellant's appeal more than sixty days after
mailing of notice was taken in time. In re
Application 7600 to Appropriate 80 Second
Feet of Water (1924) 63 U 811, 225 P 605.
Perfection of appeal
Appeal should be taken as provided in
cases of appeal from justice's court to district court, and it should be taken within
sixty days from the time the aggrieved party
receives actual or constructive notice of the
order from which the appeal is taken. In re
Application 7600 to Appropriate 30 Second
Feet of Water (1924) 63 U 311, 225 P 605.
Right of appeal.
Under this section protestants may file
petition in district court for a plenary review
of decision of state engineer overruling
protests to application for change of place of
storage of water. Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v.
Kents Lake Reservoir Co. (1943) 104 U 202,
135 P 2d 108, rehearing denied 104 U 216,140
P 2d 638.
Where plaintiff protested to state engineer
concerning defendant's applications to appropriate water from certain springs arising on
defendant's land, and state engineer
approved applications, plaintiff was entitled
to have state engineer's action reviewed by
district court Lehi Irr. Co. v. Jones (1949)
115 U 136, 202 P 2d 892.
Where engineer's certificate, issued in 1949,
permitted city to store 321.78 acre feet of
water in a specified reservoir, but between
1949 and 1969 city was permitted to draw in
excess of 700 acre feet each year, reduction
after 1969 of water allowed to be drawn to
level shown on certificate gave no cause for
complaint; any challenge to the certificate
should have been brought within 60 days of
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MILLARD COUNTY

DAVID L. WILKINSON, No. 3472
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
DALLIN W. JENSEN, No. 1669
Solicitor General
MICHAEL M. QUEALY, No. 2667
Assistant Attorney General
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UTAH STATE ENGINEER
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116
Telephone; (801) 533-4446

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
S & G, INC., a corporation,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT L. MORGAN, State Engineer
of the State of Utah,

Civil No. 7798
Hon. Cullen Y. Christensen

Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before the Court without
oral argument, pursuant to Rule 2.8.

Plaintiff is represented by

Robert P. Faust, Richard M. Hymas and Ken Chamberlain.

Defendant

is represented by Dallin W. Jensen and Michael M. Quealy.

The

Court has reviewed the file, including the memoranda of counsel
submitted on the present motion, and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises did, on September 16, 1986, issue a
ruling converting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to one for
Summary Judgment and granting the same, concluding that while
Plaintiff had some interest in the decision of the Defendant
State Engineer, such interest was collateral to the issues in
ADDENDUM ii
- 1 -

that proceeding and such interest was not within the "Zone of
Interest" contemplated as being a basis for appeal from the decision of the State Engineer*
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be and is hereby converted to a
Motion for Summary Judgment, and said Motion for Summary Judgment
be and is hereby granted, and that judgment is hereby entered
against Plaintiff dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

lis \*>
j*k
DATED this

day of £c^e»ber, 1986.
BY THE COURT:
/

LCULLEN Y-^CHRISTENSEN
District/Judge

ADDENDUM i i i
- 2 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
DISMISSAL was served by mailing the same, first class postage
prepaid, prior to signature and entry by the Court, this /y
of September, 1986, to:
Richard M. Hymas
Robert P. Faust
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
Ken Chamberlain
OLSEN and CHAMBERLAIN
Attorney for Plaintiff
76 South Main
RICHFIELD UT 84701

s4u4>^PA*

MICHAEL M. QUEA^jY
Assistant Attorney Ge

ADDENDUM iv
- 3 -

day

rvrm i i»oo

CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION OF-WATER
STATE OF UTAH
WtUt Ustc'i Claun No,

68-531

L Name and address of appropdato?

Application No.

S-5129

Certificate Ho.

JS&L

Jay ? . Gardner and Richard M> Gardner
385 East Center Street, Richfield, Utah

Whereas, it has been made to appear to the satisfaction of the undersigned that the appropriation of
water has been perfected under the above numbered application In accordance with the Laws of Utah, Therefore,
Be it known that the State Engineer hereby certifies that said appropriate is entitled to the use of water subject
to poor rights, if any, as follows:
2.

Period and nature of useIrrigation

ft*™ . AprU I

.*° , .tet<fter 31

Domestic

from

^to

Stockwatering

from ^

Municipal

from „_______________„

Other

from

to
JO
to

3.

Source of supply

Underground Water (well)

4.

Drainage area

Sevier River

S. Quantity of water

5*0 c . f . s .

«.

Priority of rie>t

August 5, 1959

7.

foint of diversion

n

South 30 feet Vest 20 feet from the KB Corner
Section 17, T17S, R6W, SL3M
Millard

m

8.

Method of diversion

16-inch diameter v e i l , 83^ feet deep

9.

Place and/or eatent of use:

Irrigation;

County, Utah.

3 7 - 8 8 a C S . !&?£&*{•

9.10 acs. R s J ^ i
36.60 acs. m*50h
7.58 ecs. KElSwJ Section 16, T17S, R6W, SISM
37.10

acs.

RWIHBJ

37.00
37.32
38.50
I3.5O
38.17

ocs.
acs.
acs,
ecs.
ecs.

E3*fle£
SW*fig*
S^NB|
HtffeSf
HsJssJ Section 17, T17S, R6W, SLBH

or a t o t a l of 292.75 acres
Shis right i s H a l t e d t o the Irrigation requirements of 2**0 acres.

10. Other rights appurtenant

Melville I r r i g a t i o n Company, from Sevier River (kO shares)

The works employed in this appropriation are to be operated and malntabed in such a manner and condition as
will prevent waste of water. This certificate entitles the holder to use only sufficient water frora all rights combined
to constitute an economic duty without waste.
The right evidenced by this certificate is subject to review by the courts (a any adjudication proceeding.

In Witness Whereof, 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of my office this m
of

June

f

ig67

20th

J»y

AMENDMENT TO WATER RIGHT PURCHASE CONTRACT
This Contract made and entered i n t o t h i s
day o f
A p r i l , 1981, between INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY, a p o l i t i c a l
s u b d i v i s i o n of the S t a t e of Utah, c r e a t e d pursuant t o the
I n t e r l o c a l Co-operation Act (Chapter 13, T i t l e 11, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended), with i t s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e at
Sandy, County of S a l t Lake, S t a t e of Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r s t y l e d
IPA, and S & G, INC., a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , o f R i c h f i e l d , County
o f S e v i e r , S t a t e o f Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r s t y l e d SELLER
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, on the 22nd day of July, 1980, SELLER and IPA
entered into a Water Right Purchase Contract and accompanying Escrow Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto
marked Exhibit "I", wherein SELLER agreed to sell and IPA
agreed to purchase the first right to 521,00 acre feet of
water annually evidenced by SELLER'S Water Right, as amended
by SELLER'S Change Application all as more particularly set
forth therein; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend, modify and supplement the following specific provisions of said Water Right
Purchase Contract as specifically hereinafter provided*
NOW, THEREFORE, it is mutually understood and agreed
by and between the parties hereto as follows:
A.

ARTICLE III IS AMENDED IN ITS ENTIRETY
TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE III
Purchase and Sale

3.
IPA a g r e e s t o purchase and SELLER a g r e e s t o s e l l
t o IPA a d i v i d e d and e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o the d i v e r s i o n and
use of s u f f i c i e n t waters under C e r t i f i c a t e o f Appropriation
No, 7865 (68-531) (SELLERS Water Right) t o s a t i s f y the s o l e
i r r i g a t i o n requirements of 228*0 a c r e s of land for the sum
of
(a) Nine Hundred Eleven Thousand Seven Hundred
F i f t y D o l l a r s ( $ 9 1 1 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 ) based on 5 2 1 . 0 acre f e e t
annually at the r a t e of One Thousand Seven Hundred
F i f t y D o l l a r s ( § 1 , 7 5 0 . 0 0 ) per acre f o o t , p l u s

(b) The sum of Forty-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Dollars Ninety-Three Cents ($48,709.93) as
the agreed adjustment to the preceding subparagraph
(a) based on the January 2, 1980/ prime interest rate
of the Citibank of New York, plus
(c) The sum equal to Eight Hundred Seventy-Five
Dollars ($875.00) times the number of acre feet in excess of 521.0 acre feet annually which shall be approved
for diversion and use for municipal purposes under the
proposed change application referred to in paragraph
8 hereinafter by
(i) the final written Decision of the Utah
State Engineer without judicial review, or
(ii) the final judgment of approval by the
appropriate District Court without appeal to the
Utah Supreme Court, or
(iii) the final decision of approval by the
Utah Supreme Court.
In the event the Utah State Engineer in the first
instance, or the Court on judicial review thereafter,
does not fix the quantity of water in acre feet which
can be diverted and used for such municipal purposes
under such change application the quantity will be
presumed to be 4.0 acre feet per acre for purposes
of fixing the amount of the foregoing payment. IPA
shall pay to SELLER interest on the sum so determined at the rate of 11.747% per annum commencing on a
date seven months after the date of this Amendment to
Water Right Purchase Contract or commencing on a date
30 days after the final written decision of the Utah
State Engineer provided for in subparagraph 3(c)(i)
above, whichever is earlier, until the date of payment
under paragraph 7 hereinafter, plus
(d) The sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00).
4.
The sum provided for in paragraph 3(a) hereinabove
was deposited with the Depositary on February 23, 1981.
5.
The sum provided for in paragraph 3(a) above shall
be disbursed by Depositary and the Warranty Deed to the water
right herein purchased shall be delivered by Depositary to
IPA, all strictly in accordance with the provisions of the
ADDENDUM vii
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